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Direct Payments of State Scholarship Funds to Church-
Related Colleges Offend the Constitution and Title VI* 
Roy Whitehead, Jr.** & Walter Block*** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The State of Arkansas provides a full academic scholarship to a state 
approved public or private Arkansas institution of higher education to 
graduates of Arkansas secondary schools who have demonstrated "supe-
rior academic ability." 1 The sole measure of the graduate's "extra-
ordinary academic ability" is demonstrated by scoring "32 or above on 
the American College Test (ACT), 1410 or above on Scholastic Aptitude 
Test (SAT) or selection as a finalist in the National Merit Scholarship 
Competition."2 The purpose of the Governor's Distinguished Scholars 
Program, according to the enabling legislation, is "that outstanding stu-
dents are an essential ingredient for the economic and social benefit of 
the State of Arkansas. Benefits accrue to the state when a majority of Na-
tional Merit Scholars and superior students attend Arkansas institutions 
of higher learning and remain in the state."3 
The Arkansas Governor's Distinguished Scholars program awards 
scholarships in amounts equal to the tuition, room and board, and manda-
tory fees charged a student for a regular full-time course load by the ap-
proved institution of higher education in which the student is enrolled.4 
There are nine public and six private, church-related, approved institu-
tions participating in the program.5 The dollar value of the scholarship 
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I. ARK. CODE ANN.§ 6-82-306(b)(4) (Michie 1998). 
2. Doug Smith, Pushinf? and Shoving For the State's Top Scholars, ARKANSAS TIMES, Aug 
27, 1999 at 13. 
3. ARK. CODE ANN.§ 6-82-301 (Michie 1998). 
4. See ARK. CODE ANN.§ 6-82-312(b) (West, WESTLAW through 1999 Sess.). 
5. See ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HIGHER EDUCATION, Student Enrollments Fall 1998, 
tbl. Ill, State Appropriations Per Student for Arkansas Governor's Distinguished Scholars for the 
1999-2000 Fiscal Year (May 1999). 
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award varies considerably between public and private institutions. For 
example, a Distinguished Scholar recipient enrolled in Hendrix, a private 
church-related institution, costs the State about $15,474 per year.6 In con-
trast, a Distinguished Scholar enrolled at Southern Arkansas University, 
a public institution, will cost the State about $5,088 per year.7 
It is critical to understand that the State disperses the scholarship 
funds directly to either the approved public or the approved private, 
church-related institutions.8 The State sends no funds directly to the par-
ents or the Distinguished Scholar recipients.9 The responsibility for se-
lecting the scholarship recipients rests with the Director of the Arkansas 
Department of Higher Education. 10 In order to keep the scholarships, the 
Distinguished Scholars must pass at least 24 credit hours while maintain-
ing a 3.25 cumulative grade-point average on a 4.0 scale per academic 
II year. 
As a condition of participation in the program, each institution of 
higher education, public or church-related, must agree to provide the 
State with administrative services in administering the program. Key 
among these services is the appointment of an institution representative 
to act as administrator of the program for that campus. 12 This administra-
tor is to receive all disbursements, complete all forms and rosters, verify 
all data, and insure compliance with all Department of Higher Education 
(DHE) program rules and regulations. 13 In addition, the institution, pub-
lic or private, must maintain disbursement records, prepare an annual In-
stitutional Financial Information Sheet for all programs administered by 
DHE, prepare a list of program drops outs, certify full-time enrollment, 
provide DHE with an institutional verification of compliance at least 
twice yearly, and finally, from time to time, submit to a DHE review of 
the institution's records to demonstrate its due diligence as a steward of 
state funds. 14 
The program has been popular with good students. The State 
awarded a total of 936 Distinguished Governor's Scholarships for the 
1997-98, 1998-99, and 1999-2000 academic years. 15 Of those, 425 
6. See id. 
7. See id. 
8. See ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HIGHER EDUCATION, ARKANSAS GOVERNOR'S 
SCHOLARS PROGRAM RULES AND PROCEDURES, Rule 5 (1999) [hereinafter DHE]. 
9. See id. 
I 0. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-82-304 (3) (Michie 1998). 
II. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-82-311 (c) (Michie 1998). 
12. DHE RULES AND PROCEDURES, Rule 5. 
13. See id. 
14. !d. 
15. ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HIGHER EDUCATION, supra n.5, tbl. I. Comparison of the 
Number of Arkansas Governor's Distinguished Scholarship Awards by Institution for the 1997-98 
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(52.6%) chose to attend a public institution, and 383 (47.4%) chose to 
attend a private, church-related institution. 16 The approximate expendi-
ture of state funds for the scholarship program has resulted in disburse-
ments of $6, 149,087 to private, church-related, institutions and 
$3,666,371 to their public counterparts. 17 As a result, 62.6% of the total 
state distinguished scholarship funds were forwarded directly to the for-
mer and 37.4% to the latter. 18 Of interest is the ethnic breakdown of the 
scholarship recipients: Four (0.4%) African American; nineteen (2.0%) 
Asian; five (0.5%) Native American; 885 (94.6%) Caucasian; three 
(0.3%) Hispanic, and twenty (2.1%) other or unknown. Finally, 532 
(56.8%) of the scholars were male, and 404 (43.2%) female. 19 
This article discusses the Governor's Distinguished Scholar Scholar-
ship Program which was designed to entice Arkansas' best and brightest 
students to attend Arkansas public and private institutions of higher edu-
cation. While perhaps well-intentioned, the program suffers from several 
fatal constitutional infirmities. We first discuss the Distinguished Schol-
ars scholarship program as it relates to the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the Constitution. We then examine the program as it re-
lates to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act and conclude that it has an un-
wholesome, disparate impact on African-American students. The article 
concludes with a few modest proposals to cure the infirmities of the 
scholarship program by achieving the intent of the program without of-
fending the Constitution or Title VI. 
II. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states that 
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of [a] religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."20 It is settled that "[t]he Four-
teenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states as incompe-
tent as the Congress to enact such laws."21 Consequently, the Arkansas 
General Assembly is constitutionally prohibited from enacting laws re-
specting an establishment of a religion. But what type of state action of-
fends the Establishment Clause? Does the Governor's Distinguished 
Through 1999-00 Academic Years. 
16. See id. 
17. See ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HIGHER EDUCATION, supra n.5, tbl. II, Amount of Ar-
kansas Governor's Distinguished Scholarship Awards by Institution. 
18. See id. 
19. See DHE supra note 12. 
20. U.S. CONST. amend I. 
21 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,303 (1940). 
194 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 14 
Scholars Scholarship Program, which provides for the direct payment of 
state funds to private, church-related institutions of higher education, of-
fend the prohibitions of the First Amendment? The answer lies in the in-
tent of the Founding Fathers and relevant case law in distributing public 
monies directly to church organizations and church-related institutions. 
A. Intent 
Thomas Jefferson's famous letter about separation of church and 
state to the Danbury Baptist Association is often cited as the primary au-
thority regarding the intent of the Establishment Clause. However, two 
James Madison veto messages and a letter to the Baptist Churches of 
Neal's Creek and Black Creek, North Carolina, arguably are more 
revealing of the intent of these writers of the Constitution and the First 
Amendment. While Jefferson's letter reflected his concern over the es-
tablishment of a state religion, Madison's veto messages and his letter 
dealt with situations like the Arkansas scholarship program. This further 
reveals his notion that religious societies should remain pure, or rather, 
separated from government influence. 
In 1811, Congress passed a bill giving certain powers to an Episco-
pal Church in Virginia.22 Among the powers granted was the authority to 
provide for the support of the poor and the education of poor children.23 
On February II, 1811, President Madison returned the bill to Congress 
with a veto message, arguing that the government had no authority over 
the affairs of the church because of the Establishment Clause. He said the 
bill violated the Constitution because it "would be a precedent for giving 
religious societies, as such, a legal agency in carrying into effect a legal 
and public duty."24 Later that same month, Madison vetoed another bill 
that, in part, reserved a parcel of government land in the Mississippi Ter-
ritory for the Baptist Church at Salem Meeting House. He maintained 
that the bill violated the principle of the Establishment Clause prohibiting 
the use of government money to support religious societies.25 
Shortly thereafter Madison received a letter from two Baptist 
churches in North Carolina approving his veto of the Bill to provide sup-
port to the Mississippi Baptist Church.26 In his response Madison wrote: 
22. THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH AN 
APPENDIX CONTAINING IMPORTANT STATE PAPERS AND THE PUBLIC DOCUMENTS, AND ALL THE 
LAWS OF A PUBLIC NATURE; WITH A COPIOUS INDEX. ELEVENTH CONGRESS - THIRD SESSION. 
COMPRISING THE PERIOD FROM DECEMBER 3, 1810 TO MARCH 3, 1811, INCLUSIVE. 982- 85. 
(Washington: Gales and Seaton 1853). 
23. See id. 
24. !d. 
25. /d. 
26. !d. 
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"having regarded the practical distinction between Religion and Civil 
Government as essential to the purity of both and as guaranteed by the 
Constitution of the United States, I could not have otherwise discharged 
my duty .... "27 It is clear that Madison believed that government pos-
sesses no authority to impose a duty or responsibility on a religious 
body.28 Nor, as evidenced in the matter of the Baptist Church at Salem 
Meeting House, does the government have the authority to use its funds 
to directly support a religious society. Madison believed that the Consti-
tution granted the government no power over religion. Religion was to be 
shielded from government influence, and the best way to separate church 
and state was to forbid the government from imposing any responsibili-
ties or duties on religious societies. To maintain this purity, government 
was given no Constitutional authority or cause to directly support reli-
gious societies. This attitude arose not from hostility to religion but from 
a desire to protect it from the heavy hand of government regulation. 
Knowing that government regulation follows government funds, the 
most prudent approach to safeguard religious purity was to prevent gov-
ernment from distributing public funds directly to private religious or-
ganizations. 
B. Case Law 
The United States Supreme Court has had occasion to deal with the 
issue of direct government aid and subsequent regulation of church-
related organizations. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 29 the Supreme Court an-
nounced a three-prong test to determine whether the Establishment 
Clause has been violated. According to Lemon, a statute does not violate 
the Establishment Clause when (1) it has a secular legislative purpose, 
27. To be supplied. 
28. As James Madison noted in the following letter: 
June 3, 1811. To the Baptist Churches in Neal's Creek and on Black Creek, North Caro-
lina. I have received, fellow-citizens, your address, approving my objection to tile (sic) 
Bill containing a grant of public land to the, Baptist Church at Salem Meeting House: 
Mississippi Territory. Having always regarded tile (sic) practical distinction between Re-
ligion and Civil Government as essential to the purity of both and as guaranteed by the 
Constitution of the United States. I could not have otherwise discharged my duty on the 
occasion which presented itself. Among the various religious societies in our Country, 
none has been more vigilant or constant in maintaining that distinction than the Society of 
which you make a part, and it is an honorable proof of your sincerity and integrity, that 
you are as ready to do so in a case favoring the interest of your brethren as in other cases. 
It is but dust, at the same time, to the Baptist Church at Salem Meeting House, to remark 
that their application to the National legislature does not appear to have contemplated a 
grant to the land in question but on terms that might be equitable to the public as well as 
to themselves. Accept my friendly respects. James Madison. 
LEITERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, FOURTH PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, 
IN FOUR VOLUMES, Vol. II 511-12 (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1865). 
29. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
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(2) its primary effect neither advances or inhibits religion, and (3) it does 
not excessively entangle government with religion.30 In Lemon the Court 
considered a Pennsylvania state statute that authorized the state to pur-
chase secular educational services from private schools and directly re-
imburse those schools only for teacher's salaries, textbooks, and other 
types of instructional materials.31 Most of the schools were affiliated with 
the Roman Catholic Church.32 These schools were subject to state audit 
and had to "identify the separate cost of the secular educational service" 
to receive reimbursement. 33 
The Court decided that the state statute violated the Establishment 
Clause because "schools seeking reimbursement must maintain account-
ing procedures that require the State to establish the cost of the secular as 
distinguished from the religious instruction."34 The Court then warned of 
the dangers of providing state financial aid directly to a church-related 
school citing Walz v. Tax Commission35 for the proposition that 
"[ o ]bviously, a direct money subsidy would be a relationship pregnant 
with involvement and, as with most government grant programs, could 
encompass sustained and detailed administrative relationships for en-
forcement of statutory or administrative standards .... "36 
According to the Court, the history of government grants reveals that 
they typically result in various measures of government control and over-
sight.37 The Court further notes that the state's power to audit, inspect, 
and evaluate a church-related school's expenditures creates an intimate 
and continuing relationship between church and state. 38 The Pennsyl-
vania arrangement violated the First Amendment because the intent of 
the Establishment Clause is to protect religion from government interfer-
ence or supervision.39 Direct payments and state supervision would cer-
tainly violate Mr. Madison's expressed "purity" view of the proper rela-
tionship between church-related schools and the state. 
In Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,40 
the Supreme Court dealt with a program that provided direct money 
grants to certain nonpublic schools for repair and maintenance, reim-
30. !d. at 612-13. 
3 I. See id. at 607-08. 
32. See id. 
33. !d. at 621. 
34. !d. at 620. 
35. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 620 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970)). 
36. !d. at 621. 
37. See id. 
38. See id. at 622-23. 
39. See id. at 623. 
40. 413 U.S. 756 (1973). 
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bursed low-income parents for a portion of the cost of private school tui-
tion, including sectarian school tuition, and granted other parents certain 
tax benefits.41 The Court decided that the maintenance and repair provi-
sions of the New York statute violated the Establishment Clause because 
its effect was to subsidize and advance the religious mission of sectarian 
schools.42 The Court also held that the tuition reimbursement plans, if 
given directly to sectarian schools, would similarly violate the Estab-
lishment Clause.43 Notwithstanding the fact that the grants were deliv-
ered to the parents rather than the schools, the effect of the aid was un-
mistakably to provide financial support for non-public sectarian 
institutions.44 
The Nyquist holding concerning payments to parents was substan-
tially weakened with respect to vouchers by Agostini v. Felton.45 In Ag-
ostini the Court stated, "[ w ]e have departed from the rule ... that all 
government aid that directly assists the educational function of religious 
schools is invalid."46 The Court rejected the argument that government 
and religion are too closely linked merely because a school voucher pro-
gram transfers money from the government to sectarian schools. The 
Court noted that "we reject the argument, primarily because funds cannot 
reach a sectarian school unless the parents or student decide independ-
ently of the government, to send their child to a sectarian school."47 Con-
sequently, Agostini supports the proposition that when parents or stu-
dents choose to use funds provided to them by the state to attend a 
church-related school, the Establishment Clause is not offended. This is 
constitutionally valid because the state funds are paid directly to the stu-
dent or parent rather than to the church-related school. As such, the State 
has no right to compel the church-related school to perform administra-
tive tasks or submit to an audit. This benefit to the parent approach, 
which allows a tax deduction for parents for certain educational expenses 
whether they were incurred in private, church-related or public schools, 
is also seen in Mueller v. Allen.48 It appears, however, that the decision 
left the Nyquist prohibition of aid paid "directly" to a church-related 
school unaffected. 
4!. See id. at 762-66. 
42. See id. at 774-80. 
43. See id. at 780-89. 
44. See id. at 781. 
45. 521 U.S. 203 (1997). 
46. !d. at 225. 
47. !d. at 230. 
48. 463 U.S. 388 (1983). The Court stressed that all the decisions invalidating aid to paro-
chial schools have involved direct transmission of assistance from the states to the schools them-
selves. See id. at 399. 
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In School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball,49 the Supreme Court dealt 
with a school district that adopted a shared time and community educa-
tion program with nonpublic schools. The program was conducted for 
nonpublic school children at state expense in classrooms located in and 
leased from private schools.50 The program offered state-funded classes 
during the regular school day that were intended to supplement, for the 
private school students, the "core curriculum" courses required by the 
state. 51 The shared time teachers were full-time employees of public 
schools.52 Of the forty-one private schools involved in the program, forty 
were church-related schools.53 The Court decided that this initiative had 
the "primary or principal effect" of the advancement of religion, and, 
therefore, violated the Establishment Clause.54 According to the Court 
"even the praiseworthy, secular purpose [of providing for the education 
of school children] cannot validate government aid to parochial schools 
when the aid has the effect of promoting a single religion or religion 
generally or when the aid unduly entangles the government in matters 
religious."55 The Court held that "[t]he symbolic union of church and 
state inherent in the provision of secular, state-provided instruction in the 
religious school buildings threatens to convey a message of state support 
for religion to students and to the general public."56 Furthermore, "the 
programs in effect subsidize the religious functions of the parochial 
schools by taking over a substantial portion of their responsibility .... "57 
Perhaps the most instructive case for our purposes is Witters v. 
Washington Department of Services for the Blind. 58 In Witters, the Court 
ruled on an objection to the State of Washington's vocational rehabilita-
tion program for the visually handicapped that financed petitioner's 
training at a Christian college.59 The record showed that assistance was 
provided under a Washington State program that paid money directly to 
the student, who then transmitted it to the educational institution of his 
choice.60 The Washington statute authorized the state to '"[p]rovide for 
49. 473 U.S. 373 (1984). 
50. See id. 
51. /d. at 375. 
52. See id. at 376. 
53. See id. at 379. 
54. /d. at 397. 
55. Ball, 473 U.S. at 382. 
56. /d. at 397. 
57. !d. The Court also said that the Establishment Clause "rests on the belief a union of gov-
ernment and religion tends to destroy government and degrade religion." 473 U.S. at 398. (citing 
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,431 (1962)). 
58. 474 U.S. 481 (1986). 
59. See id. 
60. See id. at 483. 
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special education and/or training in the professions, business or trades' 
so as to 'assist visually handicapped persons to overcome vocational 
handicaps and to obtain the maximum degree of self-support and self-
care. "'
61 Witters, who suffered from a progressive eye disease, was eligi-
ble for vocational rehabilitation assistance under the terms of the statute. 
He chose to attend Inland Empire School of the Bible, a private Christian 
College in Spokane, Washington.62 He was "studying the Bible, ethics, 
speech, and church administration in order to equip himself for a career 
as a pastor, missionary or youth director."63 
The Washington court ruled that the "principal or primary effect" of 
the state financial assistance to Witters was to train him to become a pas-
tor, missionary, or church youth director.64 In the view of the Washing-
ton court, the state aid clearly had the primary effect of advancing relig-
ion and violated the Establishment Clause.65 On appeal, the United States 
Supreme Court reversed this lower court decision. The Supreme Court 
said, 
[i]t is well settled that the Establishment Clause is not violated every 
time money previously in the possession of a State is conveyed to a re-
ligious institution. For example, a State may issue a paycheck to one of 
its employees, who may then donate all or part of that paycheck to a re-
ligious institution, all without constitutional barrier; and the State may 
do so even knowing that the employee so intends to dispose of his sal-
66 
ary. 
The Court continued, "[i]t is equally well settled, on the other hand, 
that the State may not grant aid to a religious school, whether cash or in 
kind, where the effect of the aid is 'that of a direct subsidy to the reli-
gious school' from the State."67 The issue "is whether, on the facts ... 
the extension of aid to petitioner and the use of that aid by petitioner to 
support religious education is a permissible transfer similar to the hypo-
thetical salary donation described above, or is an impermissible 'direct 
b 'd ,,68 SU Sl y. 
The facts central to the inquiry in the Witters case were whether ( 1) 
"any aid provided under Washington's program that ultimately flows to 
religious institutions does so only as a result of the genuinely independ-
61. !d. at 483 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE§ 74.18.130 (1981)). 
62. See id. 
63. !d. at 483. 
64. Willers, 474 U.S. at 485 (citing Witters v. Comm'n for the Blind, 689 P.2d 53, 56 (1984). 
65. See id. 
66. /d. at 486-87. 
67. /d. at 487 (quoting Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 475 U.S. 373, 394 (1985)). 
68. !d. (emphasis added). 
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ent private choices of aid recipients"69 ; (2) "[i]t is not one of the 'ingen-
ious plans for channeling state aid to sectarian schools that periodically 
reach this court;'"70 (3) "it creates no financial incentive for students to 
undertake sectarian education;"71 (4) "[i]t does not tend to provide 
greater or broader benefits for recipients who apply their aid to religious 
education;"72 and (5) "[i]n this case, the fact that aid goes to individuals 
means that the decision to support religious education is made by the in-
dividual, not by the State."73 
Importantly, nothing in the record indicated that, if Witter's petition 
succeeded, any significant portion of the aid spent on the Washington 
program as a whole would end up flowing to religious education.74 The 
Court stated that the respondent was "correct in pointing out that aid to a 
religious institution, unrestricted in its potential usage, if properly attrib-
utable to the state, is clearly prohibited under the Establishment 
Clause."75 But the respondent's argument did not apply in this case be-
cause there was no direct aid to the religious school.76 The Court decided 
that, on the facts presented, the Washington program did not constitute 
sufficiently direct support of religion so as to violate the Establishment 
Clause.77 Justice Powell, concurring, said that the Washington scheme 
was constitutionally permitted because the student or parent directly re-
. d h 78 ce1ve t estate payments. 
Before turning to the Arkansas Scholarship program it would help to 
review the common threads that bind these cases together. First, requir-
ing church-related schools to maintain administrative and accounting 
procedures for review by the state offends the Establishment Clause.79 
Second, payment of financial aid directly to a church-related school of-
fends the Establishment Clause. 80 Third, when there is a disparity in the 
amount of state funds spent on public and church-related students the es-
69. ld. at 487. 
70. Witters, 474 U.S. at 488 (citing Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 785). 
71. Witters, 474 U.S. at 488. 
72. !d. 
73. !d. 
74. See id. 
75. !d. at 489 (citing Grand Rapids, 475 U.S. at 395). 
76. See id. 
77. See Witters, 474 U.S. at 489. 
78. See id. at 491 (Powell, J., concurring) (citing Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 399 ( 1983) 
for the proposition that payments directly to parents are constitutional because any benefit to religion 
results from "numerous private choices of individual parents of school-age children."). 
79. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971 ); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997). 
80. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 602, Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Committee for 
P.ub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyqust, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Grand Rapids School Dist. v. 
Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Muller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Servs. 
for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986). 
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tablishment clause is offended.81 Fourth, the Establishment Clause is of-
fended by a program that creates a financial incentive for a student to at-
tend a church-related school.82 Finally, the Establishment Clause is of-
fended if the government aid is really just an ingenious scheme designed 
to channel state aid directly to church-related schools.83 
III. THE PROGRAM AND ITS CONSTITUTIONAL lNFIRMATIES 
The Arkansas Governor's Distinguished Scholars Program offends 
the Establishment Clause for a wide variety of reasons. First, the pro-
gram requires church-related institutions to agree to perform administra-
tive tasks and insure compliance with state regulations. The institution 
must submit to a review of its records and demonstrate its due diligence 
as a steward of state funds. 84 One would believe that the administrators 
of church schools would object strongly to the grubby hands of state of-
ficials thumbing through their private school financial files. It is likely 
that these same administrators would object to having a Legislative Audit 
review of their books. It is clear that the regulations run afoul of the Es-
tablishment Clause holdings under Lemon and Agostini that the state may 
not compel religious societies to perform state administrative tasks. 
Second, the state funds are paid directly to church-related institu-
tions. This direct aid offends the Establishment Clause under Lemon, 
Walz, Nyquist, and Witters. If there is one thing certain under these cases, 
the payment of state monies directly to a church-related school is uncon-
stitutional. 
Third, there is considerable disparity in the amount of state funds per 
scholarship provided to a church-related institutions when compared to 
public institutions under the program. Recall that Hendrix will typically 
receive $15,000 while Southern Arkansas will receive $4,730 per schol-
arship student.85 There is also a disparity in the total funds sent to private 
and public schools. Church-related schools received $2,182,000 and pub-
lic institutions $1,334,000 in the years 1998-99.86 This disparity in treat-
ment of public and church-related institutions also offends the Estab-
lishment Clause under Witters. 87 
Fourth, the program clearly creates a financial incentive for the Dis-
tinguished Scholar to attend a church-related school. This occurs because 
81. See Witters, 474 U.S. at 488. 
82. /d. 
83. See Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Witters, 474 U.S. 481 (1986). 
84. See DHE, Rule 6(H). 
85. ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 5. 
86. See id. 
87. See Whitters, 474 U.S. at 488. 
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the program is open-ended. The state pays whatever the church-related 
institution considers a reasonable level of tuition and fees. 88 The state 
sponsored creation of a considerable financial incentive to attend a 
church-related school is offensive to the Establishment Clause under Wit-
ters.89 
Finally, and most controversially, this scholarship program, if news-
paper reports are accurate, may be a scheme to channel state aid directly 
to church-related schools, a practice that offends the Establishment 
Clause under Witters. 90 According to Doug Smith, the impetus for the 
Distinguished Scholars program did not emanate from the DHE, but 
rather was proposed by State Senators.91 The DHE had little choice in 
implementation because fifty senators sponsored the enabling legislation. 
One of the bill's sponsors is quoted as stating that the bill was brought to 
him by the President of the Independent Colleges and Universities Asso-
ciation and by the Association's lobbyist.92 But the impetus for the pro-
gram is of questionable relevance because the legislation is so blatantly 
unconstitutional. A legal challenge of the program will almost certainly 
raise the issue of a scheme to support religious schools. It would be in-
teresting to hear the explanations the Association would offer in support 
of having the state rummaging around in its private, church-related edu-
cational programs to determine stewardship of state funds. 
Mr. Madison would also surely be taken aback. His two veto mes-
sages and letter to the Baptist Churches of Neal's Creek and Black 
Creek, North Carolina, in 1811, sent a powerful message that govern-
ment has no business regulating a religious society, giving a religious so-
ciety legal agency to carry into effect a public duty or giving direct aid to 
a religious society.93 The Governor's Distinguished Scholars Scholarship 
Program has the unique and dubious distinction of offending all of Madi-
son's notions of separation of religion from influence and regulation by 
the government. He believed that the Constitution granted government 
no power over religion. And, as in the Arkansas example, when a reli-
gious society accepts government funds in this manner the heavy hand of 
government regulation is sure to follow. 94 It makes no constitutional dif-
ference that the church-related schools volunteer for this regulation. This 
government regulation offends the Constitution! 
88. ARK. CODE ANN.§ 6-82-312(b) (Michie 1998). 
89. See Witters, 474 U.S. at 488. 
90. See id. 
91. See Doug Smith, Pushing and Shoving for the State's Top Scholars, ARKANSAS TIMES, 
Aug. 27, 1999, at 13. 
92. See id. 
93. See id. 
94. See id. 
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As we shall see, this state of affairs is regrettable because there exists 
a relatively simple and constitutionally pleasing way to retain Arkansas' 
best and brightest students. But before broaching that subject one other 
serious problem with the Distinguished Scholarship Program requires 
examination. 
IV. TITLE VI AND DISPARATE IMPACT 
Section 60 I of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimina-
tion "on the ground of race ... under any program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance."95 Section 602 of the Act effectuates the 
provisions of section 601 to racial, color and national origin discrimina-
tion predicated on recipients administering programs and activities.96 The 
U.S. Department of Education, in exercising its authority under section 
602, promulgated a regulation which prohibits a funding recipient from 
"utiliz[ing] criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of 
subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, or 
national origin, or have the effect of defeating or substantially impairing 
accomplishment of the objectives of the program as respects individuals 
of a particular race, color, or national origin."97 It is undisputed that the 
state of Arkansas receives federal funds for numerous educational pro-
grams, thereby becoming subject to this regulation. 98 
Does this scholarship program have a disparate impact on black stu-
dents? Only four (0.4%) of the 936 Distinguished Scholar scholarship 
recipients are black, while about 16.1% of the state's undergraduate stu-
dents have this background.99 The sole basis for selection of the scholar-
ship recipients is a score of 32 on the ACT, 1410 on the SAT or being a 
finalist in the National Merit Scholarship competition. 100 In Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co., 101 the Supreme Court introduced the theory of disparate 
impact discrimination by holding that a plaintiff need not necessarily 
prove intentional discrimination in order to prove that an employer has 
violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Since then, "facially neutral 
employment practices that have significant adverse effects on protected 
groups have been held to violate the Act without proof ... [of] discrimi-
natory intent." 102 The theory is based on the idea that even unintentional 
95. 42 u.s.c. ~ 2000d (1994). 
96. 42 u.s.c ~ 2000d-l (1994). 
97. 34 C.F.R. ~ 100.3(b)(2)(1999). 
98. See id. 
99. See ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 5, tbl. IV. 
I 00. See Doug Smith, Pushing and Shoving for the State's Top Scholars, ARKANSAS TIMES, 
Aug. 27, 1999, at 13. 
101. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
I 02. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986-87 (1988). 
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discrimination can be "equivalent to intentional discrimination," because 
the ultimate outcome is the same. 103 Finally, courts have applied the em-
ployment disparate impact theory to cases involving Title VI. 104 
To demonstrate a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimina-
tion, a plaintiff-student must first show that the selection practice fol-
lowed has caused a disproportionate effect that excludes him from an 
educational opportunity. 105 If such a showing has been made, the burden 
shifts to the defendant who must demonstrate that the selection practice 
is justified by "educational necessity."106 However, even if the defendant 
meets this burden, the complainant may prevail by offering an effective 
alternative practice that results in less disproportionality while still serv-
ing the goals of the educational program. 107 The racially disproportionate 
effect is typically demonstrated by the use of statistical evidence compar-
ing the racial composition of the candidates selected compared with the 
qualified candidates in the pool. 108 Applying the Title VI criteria to this 
case, it is evident that the program would not survive the disparate im-
pact test. Clearly, black students have been disproportionately impacted 
by the Distinguished Scholars standards. Only four of the 936 students 
selected, or 0.4%, were African-American. 109 
The next inquiry is whether the sole standards adopted by the State, 
ACT and SAT scores and becoming a National Merit finalist, are justi-
fied by "educational necessity." To determine if there is an educational 
necessity the inquiry is whether Arkansas has some independent basis for 
choosing the cutoff scores. For example, the state might establish a cut-
off score by using a professional estimate of the requisite ability levels to 
succeed in the scholarship program. 1 10 However, there is no evidence of 
such a professional study. The enabling legislation was presented to the 
General Assembly complete and without state agency input. 111 In order 
to survive a disparate impact challenge, the state must establish some-
I 03. /d. at 987. 
104. See e.g. Elston v. Talladega County Bd. ofEduc., 997 F.2d 1394, 1407 (lith Cir. 1993); 
Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 391 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that a disparate impact claim against the 
Pennsylvania school funding formula could proceed under Title VO. 
105. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642,656-57 (1989). 
106. Board of Educ. of the City School Dist. of New York v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130, 151 
(1979). 
107. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 998. 
108. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 650-55. 
I 09. But would these disparate impact numbers justify a private cause of action under Title 
VI? The answer, apparently, is yes. See Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that a 
private cause of action exists to determine whether the funding of Pennsylvania schools has a dispa-
rate impact on black students); Ring v. First Interstate Mortgage, Inc., 984 F.2d 924, 926 (8th 
Cir.l993). 
110. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 994-95. 
Ill. See Smith, supra note 2 (concerning the drafting of the legislation). 
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thing more than a mere articulation of the basis - in this instance, to keep 
good students in Arkansas - for the cutoff score. 112 Recently the U.S. 
Department of Education proposed regulations that provide: 
The use of any educational test which has [a] significant disparate im-
pact on members of any particular race ... is discriminatory, and a vio-
lation of Title VI and/or Title IX respectively, unless ... there is no 
practical alternative form of assessment which meets the educational 
institution's needs and would have a less disparate impact. 113 
Moreover, a recent district court decision found that NCAA initial 
eligibility rules (Proposition 16) that solely utilized a minimum test score 
on the ACT or SAT for eligibility to play constituted a disparate impact 
on African-American student-athletes. 114 Although reversed on other 
grounds, Cureton v. NCAA is instructive because the NCAA rule is re-
markably similar to the Arkansas scholarship program in its operation 
and impact. The NCAA's justification for its policy was to increase the 
graduation rate for black student-athletes and to close the gap between 
white and black athlete graduation rates. 115 But, alas for the NCAA, the 
court found that African-American athletes were already graduating at a 
greater rate than black students generally. 116 The practical effect of 
Proposition 16 was to restrict the access of black athletes to the limited 
number of college athletic scholarships available. 117 The court questioned 
whether this would decrease the graduation gap. According to the judge, 
proffering such a "back-end" (later graduation) balancing between 
graduation rates and entrance requirements violates the prohibition 
against using a "bottom line" (the blacks we accepted did well) defense 
against disparate impact in cases involving pass/fail selection procedures 
like those found in Connecticut v. Tea/. 118 
An even stronger argument that a private cause of action exists 
against the state because of disparate impact is found in a Pennsylvania 
school funding case. The Third Circuit, in Powell v. Ridge, decided that 
112. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-82-30 I (Michie 1998) (stating the purpose of the legislation). 
113. Walter Williams. Killing The Messenger, ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT GAZETTE, Sept.!, 1999, 
BIO. 
114. See Cureton v. NCAA, 37 F.Supp.2d 687 (E.D. Pa.l999), rev'd on other grounds, No. 
99-1222, (3'" Cir. Dec. 22, 1999) (providing a roadmap of how courts might treat the Arkansas alle-
gations. The Appeals Court reversed on the basis that the NCAA was not subject to the Title VI 
regulations because it does not directly receive federal funds and is not a program or activity covered 
by Title VI, citing NCAA v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459 (1999), that determined that the mere fact that the 
NCAA received funds from members that received federal financial assistance did not subject the 
NCAA to coverage under Title IX. The Court took great care to state that it did not reach the ques-
tion of whether Proposition 16 created a disparate impact on a protected class under Title VI.). 
115. See Cureton, 37 F.Supp.2d at 699. 
116. See id. at 712. 
117. See id. at 699. 
118. See id. at 700 (citing Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982)). 
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in order to go to trial, all the plaintiff must do is plead that a facially neu-
tral practice's adverse effects fall disproportionately on a group protected 
by Title VI and the implementing section 602. 119 
The final inquiry in a disparate impact case is whether there are other 
effective alternative means. To state it another way, one would ask if 
there are no other practical tests that have a less disparate impact that 
could be adopted that will achieve Arkansas' goal of retaining the state's 
best and brightest students. There is a recent Equal Protection case that is 
helpful in identifying other relevant factors that might be considered. In 
Hopwood v. Texas, 120 the court decided it was a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to take into account 
solely a person's race when making admission decisions. 121 The court 
said, however, that race may be considered along with a number of other 
factors such as playing the cello, making a downfield tackle, understand-
ing Chaos Theory, economic status, life experience, family educational 
background, whether parents are alumni, how fast a person can run, 
marital status, disability status, ACT and SAT scores, and veteran's 
status. 122 Why not consider some of those other relevant factors as quali-
fication standards for the Distinguished Scholars Program? 
V. THECURE 
It is quite easy for pointy-headed professors to criticize administra-
tive policy. Of greater interest, perhaps, is how the state can accomplish 
its stated goal of retaining more of its best and brightest high school 
graduates. This article suggests three possible modifications to the pro-
gram. First, the "direct aid" issue can be avoided by making payments 
directly to the graduating senior or his parents rather than directly to the 
schools. By doing this state funds would be expended based on the free 
choice of the student or parent. It would be the recipients' obligation to 
assure the state that the funds are being properly used and that the recipi-
119. See Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 393 (3d Cir. 1999) (The plaintiffs alleged that the 
school funding formulas had a disparate impact on the Philadelphia School District that had a 77-
80% minority student body. The court cited Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of New York, 
463 U.S. at 582, 607 n.27 (1983), for the proposition that administrative regulations incorporating a 
disparate impact standard (like section 602) are valid.). 
120. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). 
121. See id. at 935. 
122. See id. at 946. This approach is adopted by The Law School Admission Council. In its 
new publication, NEW MODELS TO ASSURE DIVERSITY, FAIRNESS, AND APPROPRIATE TEST USE IN 
LAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONS 14-15 (Oct. 1999), the Council recommends several other criteria that 
schools might employ in addition to SAT/ACT scores. They are other academic factors, demo-
graphic and diversity factors, leadership and extracurricular factors, life accomplishments, character 
and fitness, personal qualities, and skills and abilities. The Council cites Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F. 3d 
932 (5th Cir. 1996), and Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790 (1" Cir. 1998), as major cases that re-
quire consideration of several factors in the admissions process. 
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ent is meeting the required hours and grade point standards. 
Second, each recipient could be given the same dollar amount of 
educational subsidy. Assume every award is $12,000. The recipient 
would be free to use these dollars to attend the institution of his choice. If 
80% of the students decide to attend church-related schools, this would 
be constitutionally acceptable because it is their individual choice. If a 
recipient attends a public institution that costs $8,000 per year, that 
would also be acceptable as that is their individual choice. 123 
Third, the DHE can easily draft regulations to comply with Title VI 
by listing relevant factors other than ACT and SAT scores to be taken 
into account when awarding the scholarships. Hopwood and the new 
Law School Admission Council Models tell us that a wide variety of fac-
tors such as athletic ability, economic status, military service, geographic 
residence, leadership ability, parental education level, foreign travel, 
family language, race/ethnicity, artistic ability, and other relevant life ex-
periences can be taken into account. Considering these factors will typi-
cally allow for inclusion of disadvantaged members of society in the Ar-
kansas program that are currently excluded by reliance solely on the 
applicants' SAT/ ACT scores. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
By implementing these three simple corrections, the Arkansas Gov-
ernor's Distinguished Scholars Program would be brought into legal and 
constitutional compliance. These proposals would cure the infirmities of 
the scholarship program by achieving the intent of the program without 
offending the Constitution or Title VI. 
123. As noted in the example provided, there may be instances where monies granted exceed 
the amount necessary for tuition and fees. This could be remedied by the State insisting that any 
monies granted over and above tuition be spent for educational purposes and materials such as a 
computer, books, etc. 
